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PROGRESS IN GEOGRAPHY >

2019 , Vol. 38 >Issue 2: 191 - 204

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18306/dlkxjz.2019.02.004

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An overview of offshore financial centers from a geographical perspective

  • PAN Fenghua , 1, 2 ,
  • ZENG Beini 1, 2
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  • 1. School of Geography, Faculty of Geographical Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
  • 2. Beijing Key Laboratory of Environmental Remote Sensing and Digital City, Faculty of Geographical Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China

Received date: 2018-03-19

  Request revised date: 2018-10-05

  Online published: 2019-02-28

Supported by

National Natural Science Foundation of China, No. 41871157.

Copyright

《地理科学进展》杂志 版权所有
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Abstract

After the Second World War, financial globalization, an important component of economic internationalization, has become a key characteristic of the global economic development. Offshore financial centers are developed under the background of financial internationalization and innovation, and play an important role in promoting development and change of capital organization and emerging markets. Because of their unique geographical distribution and important role in the global economy and financial system, geographers have begun to study offshore financial centers. In this article, we reviewed the literature on offshore financial centers in geography. We first introduced the related concepts and changes, then examined the following topics: the location and development conditions of offshore financial centers, their regional and global influences, the interaction between offshore financial centers and the global financial system, and their development in China. Moreover, we discussed how to research offshore financial centers from a geographical perspective in the future.

Key words： offshore financial center; global financial network; tax heaven; locational conditions; geography

Cite this article

PAN Fenghua , ZENG Beini . An overview of offshore financial centers from a geographical perspective[J]. PROGRESS IN GEOGRAPHY, 2019 , 38(2) : 191 -204 . DOI: 10.18306/dlkxjz.2019.02.004

离岸金融(Offshore Finance)是现代金融业演进中最重大的创新之一,在全球金融体系中占据越来越重要的地位。2010年IMF调查数据显示,离岸金融中心(Offshore Financial Center, OFC)的资产已经超过一些发达国家的经济总量,如法国、德国和日本(郑强等, 2010)。不仅如此,它们还是全球金融网络中跨国资本存储和重新分配的节点,在全球与区域产业分工和发展中发挥着重要的作用(Clark et al, 2015)。据估计,英美前100大上市公司中至少有80%在离岸金融中心设立了分支机构,而世界50%的跨境资产和负债通过离岸金融中心进行转移(Palan et al, 2014; Garcia-Bernardo et al, 2017),越来越多的企业、个人和其他中介机构选择离岸金融中心作为金融活动的场所。金融学家把离岸金融中心称作大型经济体之间的“金融接口”和“连接全球金融的媒介”,他们认为全球化导致贫富差距不断扩大,而离岸金融中心是全球化过程中的核心要素(Chavagneux et al, 2010)。
过去30 a间,新兴金融市场得到了极大发展,其中离岸金融中心的形成和发展加快了全球金融一体化的步伐,同时也改变了国际金融中心的竞争格局。一般来说,处于国际金融体系核心地位的是全球顶级的金融中心,如伦敦、纽约和东京,它们凭借巨大的资本量加速资本的流动(Reed, 1981; Sassen, 2001),然而,对于一些低于全球平均水平的金融中心,等级与资本量的联系似乎不那么清晰(Friedmann, 1986),反而是分散在世界边缘地区且处于较低层级的小型金融中心,如马恩岛、开曼群岛、泽西岛等在世界经济体系中愈发得到重视。早期的离岸金融中心通常是一些很小的岛屿,基本上人口不到100万(Dharmapala et al, 2006),但却拥有低廉的税金、稳定的政治环境和保密的法律,能帮助企业和个人避 免或减轻税务负担(Hudson, 1999)。也正因为如此,它们经常被贴上“洗钱、犯罪、贪污腐败”的标签(Quirk, 1997)。事实上,离岸金融中心确实在金融危机中发挥了一些作用,亚马逊、苹果、谷歌这些大公司的丑闻往往也与离岸金融中心有关 (Rixen, 2013; Palan et al, 2014; Seabrooke et al, 2014; Fernandez et al, 2016)。
由于离岸金融中心在全球经济金融体系中的重要地位及其显著的区位特征,受到了地理学研究的广泛关注。离岸金融中心本身就有一个独特的地理视角,这些公司和个人作为发起方,因为税收、监管和保密等原因,注册和投资到母国之外的地方,加剧了资本在空间上的流动和集聚。分散来看,离岸金融中心只是一个个资本周转地,但综合所有的离岸金融中心可以让我们更好地了解现代金融体系网络化的运作模式(Lewis et al, 1987)。
地理学者从20世纪90年代开始关注这方面的问题。较早关注到离岸金融中心的经济地理学家是Roberts(1994, 1995),他指出虽然离岸金融中心往往都很小,但却是反映国际资本流动的窗口,并认为只有从空间和距离的角度进行研究,才能理解离岸金融中心的形成和国际金融市场的变化。随后开始出现更多关于离岸金融中心的地理学研究,主要关注那些拥有相对宽松金融市场和保密法的小岛,且这些研究多采用案例分析,如Hampton(1994)研究泽西岛(Jersey);Cobb(1998)研究马恩岛(Manx);Hudson(1998)研究巴哈马群岛和开曼群岛(the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands),他们用社会学或政治学的理论建构出不同的分析框架,揭示离岸金融中心在全球金融体系中的地位。但当时大多数研究还是集中在世界上主要的国际金融中心和主流金融市场,因此有关离岸金融的理论研究还在萌芽阶段,实证研究也很缺乏(Leyshon et al, 1994; Thrift et al, 1994; Leyshon, 1997)。近年来,地理学界突破了过去对单一离岸金融中心案例分析的局限,开始从更大的尺度进行分析,研究离岸金融中心和全球金融体系中其他组成部分的互动关系和全球离岸金融网络(Cobham et al, 2015; Ledyaeva et al, 2015)。在这类研究中,全球金融网络(Global Financial Network, GFN)成为重要的视角。全球金融网络(GFN)的概念来源于全球生产网络(Global Production Network, GPN),Coe等(2014)认为,金融业较制造业而言更加全球化与网络化,于是他们从金融地理与相关文献中,萃取出“全球金融网络”(GFN)的概念,提出网络的3个核心要素是高阶商业服务(Advanced Business Services, ABS)、世界城市(World Cities, WCs)和离岸行政区(Offshore Jurisdiction, OJ)。离岸行政区即离岸金融中心的别称,把离岸金融中心放入全球金融网络中进行研究,不仅能理解离岸金融中心本身,还能理解它们与全球金融体系中其他组成部分的互动关系。
随着经济和金融全球化的深入,以及中国在全球金融体系中地位的提升,离岸金融中心对中国金融资源在全球的配置将产生越来越重要的影响。前期研究深化了学术界对离岸金融中心的认识,而地理学则在对离岸金融中心的研究中具有独特的空间和网络视角。因此,本文将系统梳理离岸金融中心的地理学研究。文章第一部分对离岸金融中心的内涵、分类和地理格局进行介绍,第二部分介绍离岸金融中心产生的区位条件和影响,第三部分介绍离岸金融中心与ABS公司、政府和企业等机构的互动关系,第四部分则介绍中国离岸金融中心的发展状况,最后在此基础上总结并展望未来。

1 离岸金融中心的内涵与特征

1.1 离岸金融中心的定义

对于离岸金融中心,目前还没有一个公认的定义。一方面,离岸金融是经济社会不断发展的产物,其内涵会随着金融市场的变化而丰富;另一方面,离岸金融是涉及多个学科的综合体,受到经济学家、社会学家、地理学家、政治学家的广泛关注,文献中它们被称为避税天堂(Tax Haven)、保密的司法行政区(Secrecy Jurisdictions)、离岸行政区或离岸金融市场(Offshore Financial Market)。
“避税天堂(Tax Haven)”,顾名思义,是指一个低税率或零税率的行政区,Clark等(2015)通过相关文献搜索发现,Tax Haven最早出现在1920年,而1960年才有研究开始运用Offshore Financial Center的说法,且OFC出现的频率要远远低于“Tax Haven”。也就是说,早期的离岸金融中心主要的功能是帮助企业或个人避税,而随着金融业在全球的不断发展,一些政府、企业和个人提高了他们的服务要求,而“避税天堂”已无法满足这些需求,只有形成新的优势才能留住或吸引更多客户。后来,保密法、宽松的监管制度也逐渐成为企业挑选离岸金融中心的影响因素,出现了“保密的司法行政区”(Secrecy Jurisdictions)这种说法。在全球金融网络的相关研究中,离岸金融中心还被称为离岸行政区(OJ),削弱了离岸金融中心的金融特征而强调了其监管宽松的特点(Hudson, 2000)。如今,离岸金融中心的内涵已经不局限于“避税天堂”或者“保密的行政区”,而是主要为非居民提供金融服务且同时具备避税、保密、宽松的监管制度和较少信息披露监管环境的行政区(Zoromé, 2014)。因此,用“避税天堂”和“保密的行政区”来代替离岸金融中心是不全面的,“离岸金融中心”或“离岸行政区”的内涵更为丰富,代表一个涉及政治、金融、法律等方面的综合体。
Wójcik(2013b)指出,“如同全球城市一样,不能简单地回答一个行政区是否是离岸金融中心,它是一个程度问题”。因此,本文把离岸金融定义为在高度自由化和国际化的金融监管体制下,在一国金融体系之外、由非居民参与的资金融通的市场,就是离岸金融市场,市场所在地就是离岸金融中心。离岸金融中心有以下几个特征：第一,非居民性,即参与离岸金融业务的存款人和借款人均为中介机构所在国或地区的非居民,也就是通常所说的“两头在外”。第二,这些金融资本仅仅在离岸金融中心范围内流通,是“资金中转站”,不包括实体的对内投资：一方面,它们是上市企业的注册地和各类壳公司的所在地,许多跨国公司和配套的服务企业来此投资,将全球大量的资金集聚在一起;另一方面,ABS公司运用特定的金融工具来完成资金的流转,使得资金又重新分配到世界各地,离岸金融中心也是跨国投资的来源地(Rixen, 2011; Sayer, 2015)。第三,离岸金融中心有特殊的制度安排,主要包括：①离岸金融中心是一个相对自主的司法行政区,可以不受国家或政治组织的管理限制,经营运作非常灵活;②优惠的税收结构,许多经济学家将离岸金融中心称作“避税天堂”,可见离岸金融中心的基本功能就是帮助企业和富人避税,它们通过使用信托、咨询公司或者其他经济实体,对资金流动路径进行规划和管理来使纳税人义务最小化(Booijink et al, 2007);③保密性较高,尤其是一些簿记中心(资金来源和运用都在境外的离岸金融中心)。除此之外,离岸金融中心的特征往往还包括拥有优越的地理位置、稳定的政治经济环境、金融体系完善程度高、基础设施条件齐全以及国际声誉良好等。

1.2 离岸金融中心的业务和分类

离岸金融中心提供的综合性金融服务非常丰富,包括银行业务、债券业务、证券业务、记账业务、保险业务、外汇买卖业务和其他金融业务等。由于离岸金融中心社会经济发展水平差异巨大,社会背景也不尽相同,因此各离岸金融中心根据自身条件,发展了各具特色的离岸金融业务,例如开曼群岛是美国证券市场中影响最大的离岸金融市场,卢森堡是欧盟第一个通过国家立法支持发展离岸基金业务的成员国,瑞士主要承担私人离岸融资业务,百慕大是拥有最多注册保险公司的离岸金融市场等等(鲁国强, 2008; 杨叠涵等, 2013)。
关于离岸金融中心的分类,不同学者依据不同的原则进行分类。根据离岸金融市场管理模式和业务范围的不同,Palan(1998)将离岸金融中心分为内外一体型、内外分离型、分离渗透型和避税港型(表1)。内外一体型离岸金融中心是自然形成的,也是最早出现的,这些地方金融基础设施完善,国际资本能够高度自由化流动。内外分离型和分离渗透型离岸金融中心是由于政策促进而创设的,离岸业务和在岸业务分离,区别在于前者严禁资金在在岸与离岸之间渗透,而后者不那么严格。避税港型离岸金融中心实质是一个记账中心,国际商业银行为了避税并享受离岸市场提供的优惠条件,在这些地区设立名义上的机构,仅在境外的交易中起到中介作用。
Tab.1 Types and distributions of offshore financial centers

表1 离岸金融中心的分类与分布

类型 服务对象 准入门槛 主要业务 业务特点 代表地区
内外一体型 居民、非居民、离岸机构 不需要严格的申请流程 资金借贷 离岸业务与在岸业务不分开进行,不设单独离岸账户 伦敦、香港
内外分离型 非居民、离岸机构 离岸金融机构的设立需要当局批准 资金借贷 离岸业务与在岸业务分开进行,资金禁止在离岸与在岸间渗透 美国国际银行设施(International Banking Facility)、日本离岸市场(Japan Offshore Market)
分离渗透型 居民、非居民、离岸机构 离岸金融机构的设立需要当局批准 资金借贷 离岸账户与在岸账户分开设立,但允许离岸账户和在岸账户有一定程度的渗透 新加坡
避税港型 非居民、离岸机构 无金融管制 只在账簿上进行交易,无实际交易 赋税低,基本无金融管制 英属维尔京群岛、开曼群岛

注：根据孟广文等(2017)、许明朝等(2007)整理。

除此之外,还有学者根据服务范围和地域形态对离岸金融中心进行划分。根据资金的来源和运用范围的不同,Park(1982)将离岸金融中心分为主导型、簿记型、集资型和代收型。主导型离岸金融市场资金来源和运用都是在世界范围内,如伦敦和纽约离岸金融市场;簿记型离岸金融市场资金来源和运用都在境外,如拿骚、开曼群岛离岸金融市场;集资型离岸金融市场资金来源于境外而资金运用于境内,如新加坡和巴拿马离岸金融市场;代收型离岸金融市场资金来源于境内而资金运用于境外,如巴林离岸金融市场。随着金融市场的不断演进,一些离岸金融中心的功能可能有所改变。Cassard(1994)依据离岸金融市场覆盖的范围,将离岸金融中心分为国际型、区域型、岛国型。国际型离岸金融市场主要有伦敦、纽约和东京,它们的服务范围是全球;区域型离岸金融中心主要服务于区域层面,在地理上向其中心国家进一步靠拢,如新加坡、香港、巴林等离岸金融中心;岛国型离岸金融中心的主要服务是避税和保密,它们主要集中在加勒比群岛。而根据地域形态的不同,Chavagneux等(2010)认为离岸金融中心可以分为3类：第一类是被货币当局统治的州或组织;第二类是海外独立的岛屿,例如开曼群岛;第三类是地处国内但不受管辖的飞地,就像美国的特拉华州。

1.3 离岸金融中心的地理格局

离岸金融中心的地理格局有一个从欧洲逐渐向世界扩张的过程。离岸金融业务最初开始于欧洲。20世纪20年代,一些中欧国家银行开启英镑和美元的存款及借贷业务,有一些还涉及德国马克和奥地利先令等其他少数币种,但业务规模十分有限(Eden et al, 2005; Maurer, 2008)。第二次世界大战之后,苏伊士运河危机导致了英镑危机,英国政府为限制资本外流禁止了英镑对外贷款,为了维持生存,这些金融机构将目光投向了美元市场,形成了离岸金融的最初形式——欧洲美元。欧洲美元最初大部分集中于伦敦,伦敦也因此成为最早的离岸金融中心(Cassis, 2010; 潘英丽, 2010)。60年代末起,资金来源和流向开始趋于多元化,离岸金融业务在除伦敦以外的西欧大陆兴盛起来,出现了巴黎、法兰克福和卢森堡等一大批离岸金融中心。70—80年代,国际上的离岸金融中心业务量增长迅速,资产规模的增长率也居高不下,地理上则跨出了西欧的范围,向非欧洲地区逐渐扩张,包括亚洲、美洲、非洲、加勒比海地区和中东地区等发展中国家和地区。80年代,美国的国际银行设施(International Banking Facilities, IBFs)和东京离岸金融市场(Japan Offshore Market, JOM)的建立使离岸金融中心的发展得到了一个飞跃(张宗益, 2011),同时中国台湾、马来西亚、泰国先后设立离岸金融市场,亚洲货币市场在其他国家也得到进一步发展。至此,离岸金融中心已具备全球化的地理分布以及较完善的发展模式。
杨叠涵等(2013)通过2000年IMF界定的设立离岸金融中心的国家或地区,总结出离岸金融中心分布特征：多分布在岛屿、沿海地区和大洲交界处,如加勒比地区的岛国、太平洋岛国,濒临大西洋的西欧各国、濒临太平洋与印度洋的东南亚国家。这些国家(或地区)多具有悠久的金融业发展历史或具有殖民地历史。从区位条件上来看,沿海地区更容易产生对外贸易,资金的积累为金融业的发展提供了基础,而大洲交界处与周边的国家交流频繁,容易成为资金流转的结点,甚至在周围地区政治出现动荡时,这些地方可以扮演“避风港”的角色,充分体现了离岸金融中心“金融接口”和保密的功能。
目前,离岸金融中心的分布已经遍布全球,形成五大中心群,即非洲群、欧洲群、中东群、亚太地区群和美洲群,所在地区几乎覆盖了全球所有时区,使得离岸金融业务的交易在24小时内都可以不间断地进行(Cassis, 2010)。

2 离岸金融中心产生的区位条件和影响

2.1 离岸金融中心产生的区位条件

离岸金融中心目前已经实现全球化布局,那么这些国家和地区是随机产生的还是“必然”的呢?20世纪90年代,经济地理学领域存在2种观点：第一种观点认为离岸金融中心是“可替代的”,会因为制度的改变不断面临被取代的风险(Roberts, 1994)。随着通信技术的发展,距离的限制被消除,但因为面对面交流在金融活动中仍然是相当重要的,因此,在相近的时区,一些离岸金融中心会形成一种纵向的集聚。这种观点强调离岸金融中心是虚拟的、随机的。第二种观点认为离岸金融中心基于深厚的历史和社会根源,是当地的政治、历史事件、殖民文化等造成的。这种观点与离岸金融中心是随机选择的地点不同,主张离岸金融有一个惯性,是基于当时的时代背景或当地的社会历史联系而形成的,因此离岸金融中心的地点是相对“稳定”的。Warf(2002)将巴拿马成为拉丁美洲最重要的国际银行中心的原因归结为运河遗产、长期以来禁止反对黄铜板银行(Brass Plate Banking)、早期的美元化经济和免税殖民贸易区4个历史事件的作用,认为这种独特的历史地理和制度性改变是巴拿马和其他竞争者与众不同的地方,强调了历史和社会因素的重要性。Palan等(2014)认为英国和他们的殖民者因为有共同的法律和文字而促进了离岸金融活动的产生。还有一些研究表明离岸金融中心的发展与当时欧洲贵族的家庭网络和英国殖民的遗留遗产有关(Eden et al, 2005; Palan et al, 2014)。Wójcik(2013a)提出了“纽伦轴线(New York-London Axis, NY-LON Axis)”的概念,指出这不仅是2个领先的全球城市,还是2个最重要的离岸金融中心,它们掌握全球40%的离岸金融活动。他指出,离岸和在岸的金融服务在这2个城市间不断加强,是因为伦敦金融区(the City of London)和纽约存在着殖民关系,维持这2个离岸金融中心的共同发展。孟广文等(2017)对英属维尔京群岛离岸金融中心发展与空间集聚影响因素进行研究,也认为独特的人文经济因素为离岸金融市场的建立提供了基础。由此可见,更多的学者认为离岸金融中心是“固定”的,相比于地理位置来说,社会历史条件更能促进一个地区发展成为离岸金融中心。
从另一方面来说,当地政府或货币当局对其货币金融的管制加强或放松也是影响离岸金融中心产生的因素。第一种形式是对在岸政府监管加强的回应,Johns(1983)将政府干预市场的行为用“摩擦力”的概念来描述,离岸金融中心的环境比在岸市场更为宽松,因此存在很小甚至为零的“摩擦力”,也就推动了离岸金融中心的经营和发展。第二种形式是通过政策直接推动当地离岸金融中心的发展,这种离岸金融中心以发展离岸国际金融业务为主要特色,如开曼群岛、巴哈马、泽西岛等。另外,因为缺乏一些监管机构,“逃税”可能成“合理”的行为,一些法律还不是很健全的发展中国家更容易出现离岸金融中心,而且发展迅速(Clark et al, 2015)。除此之外,国际政治经济环境、地理位置便利、政局稳定、自然灾害少、基础设施完善、金融法律服务专业、金融法律健全、政策优惠也是离岸金融中心形成的主要区位条件(杨叠涵等, 2013; 孟广文等, 2017)。

2.2 离岸金融中心对全球和区域产生的影响

2.2.1 离岸金融中心的积极作用
对全球经济来说,离岸金融中心是金融创新的产物,有缓和国际收支失调,促进各国国际收支平衡的作用,其发展推进了金融国际化、自由化 (Hampton, 1996; Levich, 1998)。从区域影响来看,离岸金融中心能增加当地银行业竞争,提高资金流动。Roberts(1994)、Cobb(1998)、Luca(1999)、Sikka(2003)、Rose等(2007)、Lane等(2010)认为,建立离岸金融中心对所在国的金融国际化起到促进作用：吸引大批跨国金融机构在当地开展活动,吸引大量的国际金融人才,设计出最新的金融工具,要求相关部门参照国际标准对离岸中心进行监管,有利于金融机构、产品、人才的国际化等。另外,离岸金融中心还是一种促进国家经济发展的工具。一些最初并非离岸金融中心的司法行政区也开始为暂住的境外客户提供服务,希望在不久的将来成为一个新的离岸金融中心(The Economist, 2013)。2002年,迪拜政府宣布建立迪拜国际金融中心,2003年,佛得角政府决定的长期战略之一是发展成为主要为葡语国家和西非国家服务的离岸金融中心。除此之外,多米尼加共和国、加纳、特立尼达和多巴哥也计划建立离岸金融中心,为当地创造就业机会,促进经济发展(Bardouille, 2001; The Economist, 2013)。
2.2.2 离岸金融中心的负面影响
离岸金融是一把双刃剑,在金融全球化的大背景下,离岸金融中心也对世界金融体系产生了一些冲击。Walter(1985)在著作《秘密的资金：避税,资本流动与欺诈》中研究了离岸金融市场在运作中的制度漏洞和负面影响,发现离岸金融中心的税收政策对发达国家金融体系来说是一个挑战。Wójcik(2013b)强调了高阶商业服务公司在离岸金融活动中的重要作用,但这种ABS公司和离岸金融中心的关系对全球金融的公平和稳定性产生了负面效应,容易产生腐败的行为,代表了政府管理上的失败。而从区域层面来说,离岸金融中心的产生也会对周边地区产生一些负面影响。Cobb(1998)认为离岸金融中心对其周边国家或地区的税收和金融体系的发展都具有“腐蚀性”的作用。Rose等(2007)通过建立离岸金融中心效应模型分析了空间距离、地理位置等因素对离岸金融中心的交易活跃程度及其对周边国家或地区经济发展的影响,研究表明,对于处于被动地位的政府来讲,离岸金融中心存在着对在岸金融市场的挤出效应和对国内金融市场的冲击效应。

3 离岸金融中心和全球金融体系的互动关系

离岸金融中心作为全球金融体系中一个重要的成分,与高阶商业服务公司、大型跨国企业、政府和国际金融中心都有紧密联系。Clark等(2015)把离岸金融中心放入全球金融网络(GFN),提出网络的3个核心要素是高阶商业服务(ABS)公司、世界城市(WCs)和离岸行政区(OJ,即离岸金融中心)(图1)。在构建的框架中,ABS公司处于非常中心的位置,说明它们是连接离岸金融中心和世界城市、在岸空间的媒介。Clark等(2015)从金融和空间2个层面解释了ABS公司如何作为一个综合体连接世界城市和离岸金融中心。在金融层面,ABS公司通过设计和应用投资工具来影响企业决策和引导金融流动,利用税收、法律和监管的漏洞规避政府或政府间组织的管制,推动了离岸金融中心的发展;而ABS公司的空间化则体现在世界城市和离岸行政区上。
Fig.1 Connection between offshore financial centers and advanced business services (ABS)

图1 离岸金融中心和高阶商业服务的关系
注：资料来源于Wójcik, 2013b。

在图1中,ABS公司将离岸金融中心、世界城市和其他地区空间连接起来,而我们把离岸金融中心放到核心位置,也会发现它与其他成分的关系(图2)。跨国公司在ABS公司的帮助下,通过离岸外国直接投资将资金在离岸金融中心、国际金融中心和企业本地之间流动,在这个过程中,ABS公司为离岸金融中心带去了资金,也同时帮助企业利用了离岸金融中心的优惠政策,国际金融中心则与离岸金融中心达成了合作的关系。而对于离岸金融中心和政府来说,它们之间存在某种关系,当一方制定政策影响到另一方,另一方就会寻找一些措施进行回应。
Fig.2 Interactive relationship between offshore financial centers (OFC) and the global financial system

图2 离岸金融中心和全球金融体系的互动关系

3.1 离岸金融中心与高阶商业服务(ABS)公司的 关系

离岸金融活动的实质就是资金在离岸金融中心与其他空间之间的流动,这些流动依靠跨国公司、富人和政府的对外投资来完成,而高阶商业服务(ABS)公司在这些个体产生相互作用的过程中起到了中介的作用。由于ABS公司拥有丰富的信息来源和专业技能,无论是跨国公司还是政府,都需要ABS公司的协助。跨国公司利用ABS公司来帮助他们筹集资金,了解外国法律法规和市场,而政府需要ABS公司来帮助他们制定合适的政策吸引跨国公司来此投资(Büthe et al, 2011)。从人员构成来说,ABS公司也是金融精英、税务精英的集聚地,这些精英运用自身的专业知识和社会网络帮助企业和富人运转资金,并精心设计流程使得纳税义务最小化。Eden等(2005)提出,要理解离岸金融中心与在岸空间的互动关系,来自离岸金融中心的税务精英是一个很重要的切入点。Wainwright(2011)在英国住房抵押贷款证券化的研究中也发现,离岸金融的活动是一些金融专业人士群体和他们的客户通过紧密联系的社会网络架构而成,税务精英在投资网络中处于中心地位。他探究在信贷危机发生时,税务精英们如何利用立法漏洞使得“税务最小化”的策略得以实现,推动了英国经济金融化,但同时增加了信贷危机暴露的严重程度。Buckley等(2015) 以中国跨国公司为例,发现跨国公司是基于金融关系的网络,这些金融精英们的行为会影响资金的流动,从而对离岸金融中心和在岸空间的相互作用产生影响。

3.2 离岸金融中心与大型跨国公司的关系

跨国公司与离岸金融中心的关系是通过离岸外国直接投资(offshore FDI)来实现的(Dicken, 2000, 2007; Coe et al, 2001; McCann, 2010)。2008年金融危机之后,来自新兴市场的对外直接投资(Outward Foreign Direct Investment, OFDI)快速增长,对全球的金融地理格局产生了一定影响,而这些投资很大一部分是跨国公司的行为(Sharman, 2012)。许多学者研究发现,由于两地税收差异带来的制度性套利是这种投资产生的主要原因(Lipsey, 2004)。
提到外国直接投资(Foreign Direct Investment, FDI),一般会想到实体投资,但实际上全球大约30%~50%的外国直接投资是通过离岸壳公司(Offshore Shell Companies)来实现的(Palan et al, 2014),壳公司是指实际金融业务均在母国进行的“空壳”,一些经济大国与某些避税港型离岸金融中心之间无需满足双重征税协议,且母国的金融机构可以享受该地区的优惠税收和宽松监管政策(郑强等, 2010)。离岸外国直接投资的出现对传统的实体外国直接投资(Real FDI)是一个挑战。Haberly等(2015)利用全球FDI的数据构建出全球外国直接投资网络,发现离岸金融中心在全球FDI网络中的地位是中心而非外围的,这类投资的主要来源是英属维尔京群岛、卢森堡、开曼群岛、荷兰、瑞士和英国。在利用企业数据构建离岸外国直接投资的网络空间的研究中,Haberly等(2015)利用主成分分析法对全球离岸FDI网络进行分解,把全球分为“东部板块(Eastern Block)”“大英帝国(British Empire)”“大中国地区(Greater China)”和“美国和平协会(Pax Americana)”4个区域,证明全球离岸FDI是高度全球化的,但也集中在欧洲西北部和加勒比海地区的中心地带,并通过4个重要的历史事件解释了这些网络和子网络的形成。
在网络空间影响因素的研究中,Haberly等(2014)运用2010年IMF的数据,比较离岸外国直接投资和实体外国直接投资决定因素之间的异同,发现离岸外国直接投资和传统的实体外国直接投资在地理距离上的敏感性是相似的,对于离岸金融服务和客户还是需要面对面交流;殖民地的历史对实体外国直接投资影响不大,却很大程度上影响离岸外国直接投资。而网络空间的影响因素则涉及东道国经济规模和发展水平、邻近性、经济组织和协议、税收和制度。结果表明,离岸外国直接投资对发达国家和发展中国家都很重要,影响具有普遍性;离岸金融中心的经济特征是影响离岸外国直接投资的主要因素,而与东道国的经济水平没有很大的关系。在国际经济组织方面,OCED对离岸金融的管制力度相比于组织内的成员,对外部成员更加严格。研究还发现,第三国的滥用税收协定(Treaty Shopping)、共产主义的法律法规和离岸外国直接投资没有关系。2015年,Haberly等又构建了重力回归模型,通过全球FDI的数据,证明历史的殖民关系和距离都是影响离岸和实体外国直接投资的因素,而时区的邻近性对离岸FDI没有重要 影响。

3.3 离岸金融中心与政府(货币当局)的关系

离岸和在岸是一个对应的概念,而“在岸”就是指政府或监管机构。由于在岸空间往往有税务或监管上的限制,许多企业或个人会利用离岸金融中心逃避这种监管,从而形成离岸金融中心与在岸空间的微妙关系,而这种关系实质上就是政府或货币当局和离岸金融中心之间的博弈。Hudson(1998, 1999)用政治经济学的视角对离岸金融中心与政府的互动关系进行剖析,认为双方存在“信任”的关系,而“信任”也是离岸金融中心得以发展的核心。他以Massey的地方社会关系理论作为基础(Massey,1994),认为全球化并未将地理终结,信任是维持地方边界和身份稳定的关键因素。在此过程中,离岸金融中心的地方特性不但没有消失,地方的社会关系还得以强化,而地方特性在全球化中通过范围、区位、权利和利益的改变而改变。1998年Hudson以巴拿马为例,指出虽然当时在岸机构采取了放松性管制,但巴拿马的发展并没有受到很大的威胁,这是因为跨国银行和政府之间的信任对离岸金融中心的形成发挥了关键作用。1999年,他又对美国的国际银行设施(IBF)进行研究,发现在岸监管的逐渐加强促进了离岸金融中心的发展。虽然IBF使离岸美元返回母国,但美国的政府部门并不想IBF成为真正的离岸金融中心,从而导致银行和客户对管理机构不够信任,使得IBF在与加勒比海的离岸金融中心的竞争中可能逐渐处于劣势。由于离岸金融中心的保密和避税的功能,它们也经常与腐败和犯罪联系在一起。Ledyaeva等(2015)利用俄罗斯企业数据,发现了一种不合法的资本被离岸金融中心洗清再重新投资回原处的现象,在这个过程中,离岸金融中心提供的保密服务掩盖了原来政府当局腐败的身份,而母国的腐败程度越高,离岸金融中心的保密程度也就越高,两者这种互相激励的关系促进了资本的往返流动。
除了理解离岸金融中心与政府的相互作用机制,Martin(1997)还以多个现代离岸金融中心为对象,研究离岸金融中心与在岸空间之间作用强度大小,发现空间距离与信息不对称之间有密切的关系,即空间距离越长,信息传递速度会放慢,信息扩散能力会减弱,信息不对称程度越大,金融风险就越高。因此,离岸金融中心对在岸金融空间的互动会受到空间距离的影响,两者距离越短,信息透明性和对称性越高,离岸金融中心对在岸金融体系的影响就越大。

3.4 离岸金融中心与国际金融中心的关系

离岸金融中心经常拿来与国际金融中心(International Financial Center, IFC)作比较,两者都处于全球金融体系的中心地位,是世界上最富裕的地方,因为它们运作着全球大部分的资金。一方面,这种相似性可能导致两者的竞争,国际金融中心虽然拥有健全的法律体系,却不能用低税率和保密法吸引到更多的企业和富人,于是一些国际金融中心也开始办理离岸业务,在岸(Onshore)和离岸的界限也越来越模糊,甚至还出现了一种所谓“中间岸”(Mid-shore)的行政区,例如中国香港和新加坡,它们综合了离岸的优势(低税率,保密)和一些在岸的特征(健全的法律体系、双边贸易协定、复杂的金融市场),一些在岸行政区甚至比离岸行政区拥有更加宽松的政策(Clark et al, 2015)。如今,离岸中的“岸”已演化成为虚拟的岸,离岸金融的意义逐渐演变为制度性而非地域性。
而另一方面,由于两者独特的优势,跨国公司在投资的过程中可能分别在这2个地方注册和上市,同时享受两地的政策和税收优惠。ABS公司的总部一般会在国际金融中心,它们帮助企业利用离岸金融中心的政策优惠在其注册,而这些公司也会在当地设立办事处,由此将离岸金融中心和国际金融中心联系起来,让两者成为合作的关系。Wójcik等(2015)以中国移动为例,说明了ABS公司、国际金融中心和离岸金融中心在其发展过程中的重要作用。虽然中国移动是一家国内公司,但它却深深地融入了全球金融网络：在英属维尔京群岛和中国香港注册,在香港和纽约交叉上市,而全球先进的商业服务公司高盛在其中是重要的中介。具体来说,帮助中国移动上市的券商、律师事务所和会计师事务所的总部都在纽约、伦敦等国际金融中心,而办理这项业务的办公室却在香港,香港作为“中间岸”金融中心,连接了英属维尔京群岛和纽约,也加强了和北京以及和“伦敦-纽约”轴的联系。

4 中国离岸金融中心的发展

4.1 中国企业在离岸金融中心注册

相对发达国家来说,发展中国家更容易在离岸金融中心进行投资。有数据表明,发达国家在离岸金融中心的对外投资比例大约在25%~33%之间,而发展中国家如巴西、印度、中国等则基本在50%左右,2011年,中国甚至有74%的对外投资都在离岸金融中心(Palan et al, 2013)。而众所周知,中国的经济不是完全由市场力量控制的(Vlcek, 2011; Karreman et al, 2012; Lai, 2012),“国有企业”(State Owned Enterprises, SOE)享有在体制内国有银行部门优惠的利率和优惠准入资本市场的特权(Naughton, 2007; Sutherland, 2009),相比之下,私营企业由于受到国家银行内部的贷款和国内股票市场的控制,在获得银行贷款方面面临重重困难 (Shen et al, 2009; Lai, 2011)。因此,多数私人企业通常需要在中国以外寻找其他方法来增加他们的资本存量(Lu et al, 2009)。Buckley等(2015)解释了中国企业在离岸金融中心注册的3种原因：第一,由于国内资本市场的不完善,对外投资者需要在他们的活动中寻求成本最小化的地点,于是选择在离岸金融中心注册(Buckley et al, 2007);第二,由于国内制度失调,中国企业可以利用一些专业机构,通过另一种相对优越的外国市场进行套利,最终使资金回流到国内,这种操作是“制度性套利”(Boisot et al, 2008);第三,中国企业在离岸金融中心注册是对国内税收制度变迁的反应,自2006年以来,新法规要求所有在海外投资的国民必须在当地的国家行政机关登记,还有政策限制境外控股公司注册的规定。因此,很多样本公司都明确表示将采取必要措施,减轻任何可能产生的不利影响①( http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1342068/000114420410023516/0001144204-10-023516-index.htm.),但事实证明,在减轻国内市场不完善的高成本方面,尽管去海外的成本增加了,收益仍然超过这些额外的成本,离岸金融中心仍然受到关注。

4.2 离岸金融中心的对华直接投资

根据2013—2016年对华投资前15位国家与地区情况(表2)可知,离岸金融中心尤其是避税港型离岸金融中心对中国投资一直处于前列,如英属维尔京群岛、开曼群岛、萨摩亚等等,英属维尔京群岛甚至近几年对中国投资一直处于第二位,是中国外来投资主要源地。
Tab.2 Top 15 investors in China's mainland, 2013-2016

表2 2013—2016年对华投资前15名国家和地区

序号 2013年 2014年 2015年 2016年
1 中国香港 中国香港 中国香港 中国香港
2 新加坡 英属维尔京群岛 英属维尔京群岛 英属维尔京群岛
3 日本 日本 新加坡 新加坡
4 英属维尔京群岛 美国 韩国 开曼群岛
5 韩国 新加坡 日本 韩国
6 美国 中国台湾 美国 日本
7 中国台湾 韩国 萨摩亚 德国
8 德国 开曼群岛 德国 美国
9 萨摩亚 德国 中国台湾 中国台湾
10 开曼群岛 萨摩亚 开曼群岛 卢森堡
11 荷兰 英国 法国 英国
12 毛里求斯 荷兰 中国澳门 萨摩亚
13 法国 法国 荷兰 法国
14 百慕大 毛里求斯 百慕大 毛里求斯
15 加拿大 中国澳门 卢森堡 中国澳门

注：资料来源于2014—2017年《中国外商投资统计》。

上文提到,避税港型离岸金融中心只是作为一个记账中心,也就是说资金来源其实是其他地区,这里有2种情况：一种来自于中国本地,是“制度性套利”而形成的“资本回流”现象;另一种就是其他国家的对外投资。由于离岸金融中心的保密性,在其注册的企业信息比较保密,可能是这方面研究较少的原因。

4.3 建设人民币离岸金融中心

随着人民币国际化的不断推进,人民币离岸中心成为一个热点。人民币离岸中心是指在中国境外经营人民币业务的自由交易、不受监管的国际金融市场,是人民币内外体系循环的节点。现有一些文献将构建香港人民币离岸金融中心作为研究对象进行分析(罗芳等, 2014),也有少数对中国其他地区建设人民币离岸金融中心的可行性进行探讨(陈丽英等, 2016),还有一些国外学者开始讨论其他国家的人民币离岸中心(Hall, 2017; Töpfer et al, 2017)。哪些国家和地区会成为下一个人民币离岸中心将是一个非常有意义的议题,对中国人民币国际化的政策提出起到一定指导作用。

4.4 对建设国内离岸金融中心的研究

中国作为新兴市场,在世界经济中占有越来越重要的地位,离岸金融方面也是如此。离岸金融是人民币国际化的重要手段,离岸金融业务的开展在很大程度上是一个区域金融行业发达的标志。中国的离岸活动应该受到越来越多地理学家的关注。目前中国对于离岸金融中心本身的研究还比较少(李兵兵, 2009; 于婕等, 2013; 孟广文等, 2017),但在金融国际化的背景下,学者们开始关注如何将香港、上海等城市建成中国的离岸金融中心(巴曙松, 2008; 王应贵等, 2012; 蔡伊鸽等, 2017),也有少数研究对中国其他地区建设离岸金融中心的可行性进行探讨(边学涛等, 2014)。

5 总结与展望

总体来说,国际上地理学对离岸金融中心已有较为丰富的研究。离岸金融中心的发展是先从实践运行到后有理论体系构建的,离岸金融的理论构架伴随着离岸金融市场的发展而形成,并伴随其发展而自成体系。与国外相比,国内目前对于离岸金融中心的研究相对缺乏,存在研究范围狭窄、研究深度不够、缺少定量化研究等问题。而与其他学科相比,地理学对于离岸金融中心的研究还有很大发展空间。
地理学者大约从20世纪90年代开始关注离岸金融中心,经过近30 a的研究,对离岸金融中心的认识逐步深化。早期的研究主要关注离岸金融中心的避税功能,后来开始关注保密等其他方面的功能(Hampton et al, 1999; Cobham et al, 2015),逐渐形成一个综合全面的视角。地理学的研究特色在于其独特的空间和网络视角：从微观尺度来说,每个离岸金融中心的地理位置、经济水平、殖民关系都不相同,这些地方特性能决定它们向不同方向发展;从宏观尺度来说,离岸金融中心只是全球金融体系中的一个组成部分,它们与其他组成部分之间会通过资金流动或社会关系而产生相互作用,把这些联系综合起来,也就形成了全球离岸金融的网络。
在研究内容上,地理学早期的文献回答了许多关于离岸金融的基本问题,如离岸金融的概念、功能分类,离岸金融中心形成和发展的影响因素,离岸金融中心对全球和区域的影响等,这些研究比较成熟,且分析以案例为主,关注单个离岸金融中心的发展历程。近年来,地理学者视野更加开阔,开始关注离岸金融中心与全球金融体系中其他成分的相互作用关系,尝试解释离岸金融中心与全球金融体系的互动关系;还有学者着眼于全球,探索离岸金融中心的地理分布特征,展现不同类型和尺度的离岸金融网络。由于离岸金融中心是一个高度综合的话题,地理学家结合经济学、金融学、政治学、社会学的研究方法,开始尝试使用不同的概念框架理解离岸金融中心在世界经济体系中的地位,例如全球金融网络(GFN)、全球价值链(Global Value Chain, GVC)、国际商业(International Business, IB)等,从不同尺度重新认识全球离岸金融格局,但这部分研究相对来说还比较不成熟,还有较大的发展空间。
事实证明,流向离岸金融中心的资金不一定总是流向监管最宽松的司法行政区,而是流向那些监管制度最有利于具体操作的司法行政区(Aalbers, 2017),而这个“利”往往涉及政治利益、经济利益和社会声誉等等,因此,今后的地理学对离岸金融中心的研究不仅要关注经济层面,更要与政治、社会学有交叉,这样才能帮助我们更好地理解离岸金融中心的起源、发展和未来趋势。除此之外,在全球化与金融化导致全球经济发展越来越不均衡的背景下,离岸金融业务和市场的内涵日趋复杂,离岸金融中心的空间格局可能会有所改变。由于传统离岸金融中心的衰落和新兴金融中心的崛起而重塑的新离岸金融格局以及背后的影响因素和作用机制都值得地理学再去探寻,同时也需要学者找寻新的视角来看待这些问题。对中国来说,在外商投资方面,自改革开放以来,以英属维尔京群岛、开曼群岛等为代表的避税港型离岸金融市场的对华投资额就一直保持前列(孟广文等, 2017),而大部分中国在海外上市的企业也选择这些离岸金融中心作为注册地(Pan et al, 2014),这种现象背后的原因以及中国如何融入全球离岸金融网络也值得地理学者思考。

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

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[Chen L Y, Jiang H W.2016. The research on pattern's selection of RMB offshore financial center in Shanghai pilot free trade zone. Zhejiang Finance, (4): 66-75. ]

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[Li B B.2009. Analysis on the formation and development of offshore financial center in Cayman Islands. Commercial Times, (36): 93-94. ]

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[Luo F, Lv Q H.2014. Construction of RMB offshore financial center in Hong Kong under the background internationalization. China Collective Economy, (18): 101-102. ]

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孟广文, 赵园园, 刘函, 等. 2017. 英属维尔京群岛离岸金融中心发展历程及启示[J]. 地理科学进展, 36(6): 709-719.本文利用文献梳理与案例分析方法,以英属维尔京群岛为例,分析了其＂避税港＂与空间集聚、初级离岸中心与空间集聚重组以及发达离岸中心与空间集聚强化的发展历程;研究发现,国际政治经济环境为离岸金融中心的建立提供了可能,独特的自然与人文经济条件为离岸金融中心的建立提供了基础,而不断完善的法律与监管则保证了离岸金融中心的可持续发展;基于此,中国应积极探讨在上海、广东与天津等自贸区建立分离—渗透型,在东南沿海选择合适的岛屿或群岛建立避税港型离岸金融中心的可行性与实施方案,并逐步完善政策法律体系,有效管控金融风险。

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[Meng G W, Zhao Y Y, Liu H, et al.2017. Development and implications of the offshore financial center in the British Virgin Islands. Progress in Geography, 36(6): 709-719. ]

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王应贵, 杨婕, 姚静. 2012. 香港离岸金融中心的国际地位与竞争力分析[J]. 亚太经济, (2): 139-144.本文基于离岸金融角度，研究香港银行业、股票市场和资产管理业务的国际化经营特点。并以1995—2011年季度数据量化变量之间的长期均衡关系，探讨香港银行业的离岸资产与负债增长特点、股票市场的国际化运作方式，以及资产管理业迅速发展的原因，并用格兰杰因果检验方法量化离岸金融与在岸经济和在岸金融的长期均衡关系。

[Wang Y G, Yang J, Yao J.2012. The competitive of Hong Kong as an offshore financial center. Asia-pacific Economic Review, (2): 139-144. ]

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许明朝, 高中良. 2007. 论中国离岸金融模式的选择[J]. 国际金融研究, (12): 70-76.离岸金融市场是现代金融市场的重要组成部分,随着我国金融对外开放程度的加大,为进一步提高我国金融业的国际地位和竞争力,应当积极筹划和建设我国的离岸金融市场。然而,根据不同类型离岸金融模式的利弊及所需具备的条件,我们必须慎重选择,确立适合我国国情的离岸金融模式,做到运作有序、管理规范。

[Xu M C, Gao Z L.2007. The choice of China's offshore financial model. Studies of In-ternational Finance, (12): 70-76. ]

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[Yang D H, Chen Y.2013. Geographic distribution characteristics of the world's offshore financial centers. World Regional Studies, 22(1): 97-104. ]

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于婕, 孟广文, 樊一帆. 2013. 英属马恩岛的离岸金融发展特征及启示[J]. 港口经济, (8): 38-41.随着改革深化和经济转型,我国迫切需要金融制度改革创新,特别是离岸金融中心和市场的建立。目前,我国学者对离岸金融的研究主要集中在其含义、模式、发展轨迹等方面,仍然缺少对一些较为成功的案例研究。本文选取以避税港型(簿记型)离岸金融中心为特色的马恩岛为例,分析其离岸金融发展的特色,并探讨其对我国建立离岸金融中心及市场的模式以及区位选择的启示及意义。

[Yu J, Meng G W, Fan Y F.2013. The development characteristics and enlightenment of offshore finance in British Manx. Port Economy, (8): 38-41. ]

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郑强, 杨瑞. 2010. 加勒比海地区离岸金融业的发展与趋势分析[J]. 北方经济, (9): 85-87.正风景宜人的加勒比海地区一直是人们梦寐以求的旅游度假的理想去处。对于各大知名企业老板和国际金融家来说,加勒比海地区的英属维尔京群岛、

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Cobb S C.1998. Global finance and the growth of offshore financial centers: The Manx experience[J]. Geoforum, 29(1): 7-21.The globalization of the world economy and the concomitant increasing complexity of the global financial system has resulted in a large number of relatively small places functioning as offshore financial centers (OFCs). OFCs provide an alternative avenue for capital to be invested (literally) in offshore markets. This paper argues that these small places have to strive hard to link in to the global economy in a reputable fashion and have to do so through the creation of spatially focused financial regulation and supervision. The importance of the constructs of trust, knowledge, reputation, and networks in the functioning of offshore financial services is explored. A conceptual framework is developed to illustrate how OFCs link in to the global economy along three dimensions: regulation, location, and function. A case study of the rise of the Isle of Man as an OFC provides empirical evidence regarding global-local linkages and the importance of creating an appropriately balanced regulatory regime.

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Cobham A, Janský P, Meinzer M.2015. The financial secrecy index: Shedding new light on the geography of secrecy[J]. Economic Geography, 91(3): 281-303.Both academic research and public policy debate aroundtax havensandoffshorefinance typically suffer from a lack of definitional consistency. Unsurprisingly then, there is little agreement about which jurisdictions ought to be considered as tax havens r which policy measures would result in their not being so considered. In this article we explore and make operational an alternative concept, that of asecrecy jurisdictionand present the findings of the resulting Financial Secrecy Index (FSI). The FSI ranks countries and jurisdictions according to their contribution to opacity in global financial flows, revealing a quite different geography of financial secrecy from the image of small island tax havens that may still dominate popular perceptions and some of the literature onoffshore finance. Some major (secrecy-supplying) economies now come into focus. Instead of a binary division between tax havens and others, the results show a secrecy spectrum, on which all jurisdictions can be situated, and that adjustment for the scale of business is necessary in order to compare impact propensity. This approach has the potential to support more precise and granular research findings and policy recommendations.

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[52]
Ledyaeva S, Karhunen P, Kosonen R, et al.2015. Offshore foreign direct investment, capital round-tripping, and corruption: Empirical analysis of Russian regions[J]. Economic Geography, 91(3): 305-341.Recent economic geography research has identified the round-tripping of capital from emerging economies to offshore financial centers (OFCs) and back as foreign direct investment (FDI) as a central element of the global offshore FDI network. However, the factors behind this phenomenon are not yet fully understood. Our study develops a general framework that conceptualizes the phenomenon of round-trip investment. In particular, we argue that secrecy arbitrage, defined as interplay of onshore corruption and offshore secrecy, largely explains round-trip investment between onshore jurisdictions and OFCs. First, we argue that part of the round-trip FDI consists of proceeds from corruption, which is laundered in OFCs and reinvested back to the location of origin. Second, we maintain that the secrecy dimension of the OFC also motivates the round-tripping of licit capital, as businesses use the secrecy provided by OFCs to hide their true identities from corrupt authorities in the home location. To test the validity of our argument about onshore corruption as a driver for round-trip investment, we empirically analyze firm-level data on the distribution of offshore FDI (which, we argue, is largely round-trip) across Russian regions. Our empirical findings confirm that FDI from OFCs is positively associated with host region corruption, and this relationship is stronger for OFCs with a higher secrecy score. Hence, we conclude that round-trip FDI is strongly motivated by the interplay between onshore corruption and offshore secrecy.

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[53]
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Leyshon A, Tickell A.1994. Money order? The discursive construction of Bretton Woods and the making and breaking of regulatory space[J]. Environment and Planning A, 26(12): 1861-1890.

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Lipsey R E.2004. Home-and host-country effects of foreign direct investment [M]// Challenges to globalization: Analyzing the economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 333-382.

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Lu S F, Yao Y.2009. The effectiveness of law, financial development, and economic growth in an economy of financial repression: Evidence from China[J]. World Development, 37(4): 763-777.In an economy characterized by financial repression, enhancing the legal system may hinder the development of some aspects of the financial sector, especially informal arrangements aiming at circumventing the repression. Using Chinese provincial data in the 1990s, we find that enhanced legal system suppresses private investment and has no effect on financial depth although it increases the private share of bank credits and bank competition. We interpret these findings as evidence showing the existence of the leakage effect that moves financial resources from the privileged state sector to the rationed private sector. In addition, we find that enhanced legal system does not have a significant effect on the average GDP growth rate. We conclude that the smooth functioning of the legal system requires other institutions to complement.

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Palan R, Murphy R, Chavagneux C.2013. Tax havens: How globalization really works [M]. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Palan R, Nesvetailova A.2014. Elsewhere, ideally nowhere: Shadow banking and offshore finance[J]. Politik, 16(4): 26-34.

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Pan F, Brooker D.2014. Going global? Examining the geography of Chinese firms' overseas listings on international stock exchanges[J]. Geoforum, 52: 1-11.In a globalising world, as economies are becoming increasingly integrated the number of firms seeking to connect to global capital markets and list on international stock exchanges is rapidly rising. Up to 2011 there have been more than 1000 Chinese firms listed on overseas stock exchanges. As a dynamic and emerging economy, the connection of Chinese firms to global capital markets and flows has the potential to reshape economic geography at a variety of geographical scales. Despite this, there has been limited academic enquiry attending to these issues and exploring the internationalisation of Chinese firms through overseas listing. Using a comprehensive dataset, this paper addresses this research lacuna and provides a preliminary analysis of the geography of overseas listings. The paper describes how the trend and geography of Chinese firms listing overseas started in the late 1980s but has grown rapidly in the past decade. Hong Kong, New York, Singapore, and London are the major destinations of larger Chinese firms for overseas listing, while emerging destinations such as Germany, South Korea, Australia, and Canada are attracting more firms. We found that firms in different locations and sectors favoured different markets. Generally listing firms tend to originate from eastern China, reflecting the spatial pattern of the Chinese economy. The paper argues that there are two main factors influencing the geography of Chinese firms overseas listing activity. The first is the role of the state in influencing, and in some cases, directly determining the locational choice of overseas listing for Chinese firms. The second is the effect of proximity preferences in influencing the decision taken by some firms to list in particular overseas markets. The paper closes with a discussion on the impacts of overseas listings domestically in China and globally on international exchanges where firms list.

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[72]
Rixen T.2013. Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble: Shadow banking, offshore financial centers, and jurisdictional competition[J]. Regulation & Governance, 7(4): 435-459.A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? This paper develops an explanation based on a two-level game. On the international level, governments are engaged in competition for financial activity. On the domestic level, governments are prone to capture by financial interest groups, but also susceptible to demands for stricter regulation by the electorate. Governments try to square the circle between the conflicting demands by adopting incremental and symbolic, but largely ineffective, reforms. The explanation is put to empirical scrutiny by tracing the regulatory initiatives on shadow banks and OFCs at the international level and within the United States and the European Union, where I focus on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

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[73]
Roberts S M.1994. Fictitious capital, fictitious spaces: The geography of offshore financial flows[M]// Corbridge S, Martin R, Thrift N. Money, power, and space. Oxford: Blackwell: 91-115.

[74]
Roberts S M.1995. Small place, big money: The Cayman Islands and the international financial system[J]. Economic geography, 71(3): 237-256.This paper examines the offshore financial center (OFC) of the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean as part of an attempt, on the one hand, to map emerging geographies associated with rapid and far-reaching changes in the international financial system, and, on the other hand, to further a Marxian understanding of how capital increases its flexibility and averts crisis (not unproblematically) through the financial system. Thus, in this paper, the major industries of the offshore sector in the Caymans are outlined and their development presented. I then examine the Cayman Islands'' development and operation as an OFC in two wider contexts: first, changes in the practice of international banking, and second, the regional competition between 090008entrepreneurial islands090009 for offshore finance. I argue that the development of new spaces in the global economy090000OFCs090000cannot be understood without an understanding of changes in the international financial system (new markets, instruments, risks, and others). Furthermore, the changes in the international financial system cannot be understood except as operating through space and specifically through distinct spaces such as the OFCs. Although the Cayman Islands are a small place, they have strategically positioned themselves at the nexus of the circuits of fast and fungible financial capital and offer a window on the workings of the international financial system.

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[75]
Rose A K, Spiegel M M.2007. Offshore financial centres: Parasites or symbionts?[J]. The Economic Journal, 117(523): 1310-1335This article analyses the causes and consequences of offshore financial centres (OFCs). While OFCs are likely to encourage bad behaviour in source countries, they may also have unintended positive consequences, such as providing competition for the domestic banking sector. We derive and simulate a model of a home country monopoly bank facing a representative competitive OFC which offers tax advantages attained by moving assets offshore at a cost that is increasing in distance to the OFC. Our model predicts that proximity to an OFC is likely to be pro-competitive. We test and confirm the predictions empirically. OFC proximity is associated with a more competitive domestic banking system and greater overall financial depth.

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[76]
Sassen S.2001. The global city: New York, London, Tokyo [M]. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[77]
Sayer A.2015. Why we can't afford the rich [M]. Bristol: Policy Press.

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Sharman J C.2012. Chinese capital flows and offshore financial centers[J]. The Pacific Review, 25(3): 317-337.

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Shen Y, Shen M, Xu Z, et al.2009. Bank size and small-and medium-sized enterprise (SME) lending: Evidence from China[J]. World Development, 37(4): 800-811.

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Sikka P.2003. The role of offshore financial centres in globalization [C]// Accounting Forum, Vol. 27. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.: 365-399.

[82]
Sutherland D.2009. Do China's "national team" business groups undertake strategic-asset-seeking OFDI?[J]. Chinese Management Studies, 3(1): 11-24.Purpose – This paper aims to explore the contribution of China's largest business groups to China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), looking particularly at the question of whether they contribute to strategic-asset-seeking OFDI. Design/methodology/approach – It uses national-level data and business group OFDI data to explore the sectors from which OFDI originates and destinations to which it is sent. From this conclusions are drawn as to the types of investments being made. Findings – In the national context strategic-asset-seeking OFDI from China has been rather limited to date. Instead, OFDI expansion still appears more closely linked to China's expansion as a trading nation with a natural resource deficit. Strategic-asset-seeking OFDI when it does take place, moreover, is orchestrated to a large extent through large state controlled business groups, as is much other OFDI. Research limitations/implications – A limitation of this research is the reliance on official data and the assumed simplification that most strategic-asset-seeking OFDI is concentrated in the manufacturing industries. Practical implications – More attention should be paid to the role of these select business groups as they play a significant part in China's OFDI. Originality/value – There is a growing presumption that much of China's OFDI is strategic-asset-seeking in nature and that new theories are required to explain this trend. Many firm-level studies, however, rely upon just a few high-profile but unrepresentative cases. This paper redresses this imbalance. It also shows that China's largest trial business groups have played an important role in her OFDI to date.

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[83]
The Economist. 2013. Special report: Offshore finance [N/OL]. 2013-02-16 [2017-04-22]. .

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Thrift N, Leyshon A.1994. A phantom state? The de-traditionalization of money, the international financial system and international financial centres[J]. Political Geography, 13(4): 299-327.In what ways can we write about the ‘politics’ of international money? This paper is an attempt to answer this question in three different but related ways, each of which forms a major section of the paper. First, we attempt to describe international money as a hybrid of time, space and risk with increasingly formidable communicative demands. Second, we attempt to describe the structures of governance of international money, concentrating especially on the four main actor-networks of nation-states, the media, money capitalists and machines. Third, we try to settle some of the claims made in the previous two sections by reference to the de-traditionalization of the City of London over the last 30 years or so. The paper concludes with a short disquisition on the concept of the ‘public sphere’ as it might be applied to the world of international money.

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[85]
Töpfer L M, Hall S.2017. London's rise as an offshore RMB financial centre: State-finance relations and selective institutional adaptation[J]. Regional Studies, doi: 10.1080/00343404.2016.1275538.China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB), is increasingly important in global financial markets, facilitated by the global expansion of offshore RMB centres. This paper examines London’s development as the first Western offshore RMB centre established in 2013, drawing on original research conducted between 2013 and 2015 in London and China. The longitudinal analysis reveals that the development of RMB finance in London is characterized by selective adaptation in which state–private bargaining dynamics have shifted from strategic alignment to a bifurcation of interests. Understanding these state–finance relations has important implications for research and policy-making concerned with (offshore) financial centres and RMB internationalization.

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[86]
Vlcek W.2011. Byways and highways of direct investment: China and the offshore world[J]. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 39(4): 111-142.

[87]
Wainwright T.2011. Tax doesn't have to be taxing: London's 'onshore' finance industry and the fiscal spaces of a global crisis[J]. Environment and Planning A, 43(6): 1287-1304.

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Walter I.1985. Secret money: The world of international financial secrecy[M]. Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin.

[89]
Warf B.2002. Tailored for Panama: Offshore banking at the crossroads of the Americas[J]. Geografiska Annaler, 84(1): 33-47.With the steady integration of a deregulated world of hypermobile capital, offshore banking has become an increasingly significant part of the geography of international finance. Many interpretations tend to treat offshore banking centres as identical sites of investment that can be easily substituted for one another by completely mobile, fungible capital. This paper explores the nature of offshore banking in one largely overlooked centre, Panama. It charts the historic context that led to the creation of Latin America's most important centre of international banking, emphasizing the unique qualities that stand in contrast to hyperglobalist interpretations, including the Canal and the role of the US dollar. Second, it summarizes the regulatory changes initiated in the face of global neoliberalism, including the absence of a central bank and recent reforms designed to attract foreign capital. Using primary and secondary data, the paper maps Panama's growing role as a net capital exporter, charting domestic and foreign loan markets. Finally, it also addresses the trade090009offs between confidentiality, and transparency in the context of illicit activities frequently alleged to occur in offshore banking centres, which in Panama revolve around drug trafficking and money laundering. It concludes by noting that even in an ostensibly seamless world, offshore banking exhibits the place090009based embeddedness of financial capital within local institutional relations.

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[90]
Wójcik D.2013a. The dark side of NY-LON: Financial centres and the global financial crisis[J]. Urban Studies, 50(13): 2736-2752.This paper brings financial centres into the debate on the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis, by focusing on New York and London. It argues that the degree of commonality, complementarity and connectivity between the two leading global financial centres justifies the use of the term the New York-London axis' (the axis). It shows that the global financial crisis 2007-09 originated to large extent in the axis rather than in an abstract space of financial markets. The dominance of the axis in global finance can be easily underestimated and evidence suggests that, contrary to expectations the axis is not in decline. The main implication is that the debate on global financial reform has to take seriously the reality of global financial centres. In particular, if global finance is to change, the New York-London axis has to change.

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[91]
Wójcik D.2013b. Where governance fails: Advanced business services and the offshore world[J]. Progress in Human Geography, 37(3): 330-347.

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[92]
Wójcik D, Camilleri J.2015. 'Capitalist tools in socialist hands'? China Mobile in global financial networks[J]. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 40(4): 464-478.The paper analyses the evolution of China Mobile – one of China's pioneer ‘national champions’, and one of the world's largest telecom companies – through the lens of global financial networks, focusing on the role of advanced business services, financial centres and offshore jurisdictions in economic development. It demonstrates that despite being a domestic company, China Mobile is plugged firmly into the global financial networks, with incorporation in Hong Kong, cross-listing in Hong Kong and New York, and opaque offshore companies registered in the British Virgin Islands. Global advanced business services firms, with Goldman Sachs in the lead, have been instrumental in the very conception of China Mobile in 1997 and its subsequent expansion, thus helping the Chinese government consolidate and modernise the whole telecom sector. The study highlights the position of Hong Kong as an onshore-offshore financial centre intermediating between global financial markets and mainland China, and underwriting the reputation of China's ‘national champions’. The analysis also points to the advantages of Beijing over Shanghai as a command centre of state-owned and controlled enterprises, acting as a magnet for advanced business services. The relevance of global financial networks to China, a latecomer on the stage of financial globalisation, highlights the scope for applying the concept to the rest of the world, and its potential contribution to economic geography.

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[93]
Zoromé A.2014. Concept of offshore financial centers: In search of an operational definition[J]. Global Economy Journal, 9(2): 1-32.This paper offers additional evidence on the structure of the international financial network as emerging from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset collected by the IMF. Making use of blockmodeling techniques which allow us to fit a given community partition to real data, we show that the system is characterized by the presence of a particular type of meso-scale structure known as core–periphery, in which a densely connected subset of nodes (core) coexists with a sparsely connected partition (periphery), while the members of the core act as intermediaries between members of the periphery. The composition of the core – whose constituents are identified as the set of systemically important international financial centers – is rather small and remains stable over time. In addition to very large economies playing host to well-known global financial centers, the core comprises several off-shore financial markets.

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